The Claw Report — MCP Security Intelligence

Research, findings, and a 5-episode podcast on zero trust, sandbox isolation, and running AI agents safely.

Runtime AI Security podcast cover

Security Research — Telemetry Analysis

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LLM-Facing Security Telemetry: 13 Guides (Overview)

An index and overview of the 13-part telemetry analysis series covering instruction injection, trust boundaries, tool poisoning, and other attack surfaces observed at the model layer.

Overview
01

Instruction Injection

02

Trust-Boundary Crossing

03

Tool-Definition Poisoning

04

Tool Shadowing and Identity Confusion

05

Tool Selection and Argument Manipulation

06

Sensitive-Context Disclosure and Canary Emission

07

Persistent Influence Through Context or Memory

08

Cache State, Retention and Inference Isolation

09

Refusal and Compliance Behavior

10

Grammar Constraints and Sampler Effects

11

Model-Level Looping and Repetitive Continuation

12

Resource Exhaustion and Context Pressure

13

Protocol, Authorization and OS Boundaries

Blog Posts

Research

Not Every Security Event Happens Inside the Model

A protocol flaw, a broken authorization check, or a server-side process action can be a real security event with zero effect on model…

2026-09-10 · 3 min read
Research

Resource Exhaustion: The Attack That Doesn't Need to Say Anything Malicious

Sometimes the payload isn't a bad instruction — it's just size. A long enough input, or one crafted to induce a long enough output, can…

2026-09-10 · 4 min read
Research

When the Model Gets Stuck: Looping, Repetition, and Knowing the Difference From a Long Correct Answer

A model that repeats itself and a model that hit its output limit look identical from the outside unless you check the actual generated…

2026-09-10 · 3 min read
Research

Grammar Constraints Don't Change What the Model Wants — Just What It's Allowed to Say

A GBNF grammar or a sampling chain can force syntactically valid output. It says nothing about whether the underlying model would have…

2026-09-10 · 4 min read
Research

Refusal Theater: Why "I Cannot" Doesn't Always Mean No

A response can open with refusal language and still comply a few sentences later — or quote a refusal without meaning it. Measuring…

2026-09-10 · 4 min read
Research

Cache State and Inference Isolation: When Auxiliary Work Leaks Into the Real Answer

An integrating application can retain, reuse, or misassign inference state across requests. The question worth asking isn't 'is the cache…

2026-09-10 · 4 min read
Research

Persistent Influence: How Something Said Three Turns Ago Still Steers the Model

"Memory" in most agent stacks is just older text still sitting in the context window. That's enough for a single injected line to keep…

2026-09-10 · 4 min read
Research

Sensitive-Context Disclosure: Using Canaries to Catch Exact Leaks

Did the model leak the secret you put in its context, or did it just sound like it might have? Canary tokens turn that question into a…

2026-09-10 · 4 min read
Research

Right Tool, Wrong Argument: Splitting Selection From Payload

An agent can choose exactly the correct tool and still get compromised — because tool selection and argument construction are two separate…

2026-09-10 · 4 min read
Research

Tool Shadowing: Two Tools, One Name, and a Model That Can't Tell Them Apart

When a competing tool definition shares a name or description with a legitimate one, the model — and sometimes the protocol itself — has…

2026-09-10 · 4 min read
Research

Tool-Definition Poisoning: When the Tool's Description Is the Attack

You never have to call a malicious tool if its description alone can redirect the model's plan. Tool-definition poisoning hides in text…

2026-09-10 · 4 min read
Research

Trust-Boundary Crossing: It's Not What the Text Says, It's Where It Came From

A model that treats a tool result as more authoritative than the system prompt has crossed a trust boundary — regardless of whether the…

2026-09-10 · 5 min read
Research

Instruction Injection: When Data Talks Back

Instruction injection happens when text that should be inert task data — a tool result, a document, a SKILL.md file — gets read by the…

2026-09-10 · 5 min read
Product

How We Test MCP Servers with 86 Attack Techniques

Inside VerifyClaw's SAF-MCP audit: 33 static signature checks, disposable Morph Cloud sandboxes seeded with honeypot canaries,…

2026-08-01 · 7 min read
Research

78,000 Skills Scanned: What We Found

79,239 skills catalogued from ClawHub, 75,357 graded by our grammar engine, 5,015 flagged CRITICAL or HIGH. Credential dumping and prompt…

2026-07-30 · 7 min read
Threat Analysis

We Found a Security Scanner That's Actually a Trojan

177,980 downloads, a grammar score of 0, and a deep scan that came back CRITICAL 95. SkillScan poses as a mandatory security gate for…

2026-07-28 · 6 min read

Podcast Episodes — Runtime AI Security

01

Why Trusted Authors Are Not Safe Code

The opening episode of Runtime AI Security introduces Zero Trust and Sandbox Isolation and its central thesis: author trust is an identity concept, sandbox isolation is a…

17:34
02

Jumping the Sandbox Without Touching It

A defensive walk through the manuscript's attack-vector taxonomy, focused on adversaries who target trust signals instead of the sandbox itself. Covers trusted publisher…

16:31
03

Impersonation, Time Bombs, and Legal Loopholes

The second half of the attack-vector chapter covers the subtler manipulations of trust: homoglyph and typosquatting impersonation, fabricated and synthetic endorsements, delayed…

17:18
04

Attaching as a Callee: Defensive Probes

Episode four turns from attack to defense. We walk through the book's third chapter, where security testers attach probes directly to the sandbox, the trust verification system,…

17:22
05

The Secure Boundary Model and Its Thirteen Principles

The final episode of Runtime AI Security assembles the defensive architecture from Zero Trust and Sandbox Isolation: thirteen principles anchored in a zero-trust baseline,…

19:31