Research, findings, and a 5-episode podcast on zero trust, sandbox isolation, and running AI agents safely.
An index and overview of the 13-part telemetry analysis series covering instruction injection, trust boundaries, tool poisoning, and other attack surfaces observed at the model layer.
OverviewA protocol flaw, a broken authorization check, or a server-side process action can be a real security event with zero effect on model…
2026-09-10 · 3 min read ResearchSometimes the payload isn't a bad instruction — it's just size. A long enough input, or one crafted to induce a long enough output, can…
2026-09-10 · 4 min read ResearchA model that repeats itself and a model that hit its output limit look identical from the outside unless you check the actual generated…
2026-09-10 · 3 min read ResearchA GBNF grammar or a sampling chain can force syntactically valid output. It says nothing about whether the underlying model would have…
2026-09-10 · 4 min read ResearchA response can open with refusal language and still comply a few sentences later — or quote a refusal without meaning it. Measuring…
2026-09-10 · 4 min read ResearchAn integrating application can retain, reuse, or misassign inference state across requests. The question worth asking isn't 'is the cache…
2026-09-10 · 4 min read Research"Memory" in most agent stacks is just older text still sitting in the context window. That's enough for a single injected line to keep…
2026-09-10 · 4 min read ResearchDid the model leak the secret you put in its context, or did it just sound like it might have? Canary tokens turn that question into a…
2026-09-10 · 4 min read ResearchAn agent can choose exactly the correct tool and still get compromised — because tool selection and argument construction are two separate…
2026-09-10 · 4 min read ResearchWhen a competing tool definition shares a name or description with a legitimate one, the model — and sometimes the protocol itself — has…
2026-09-10 · 4 min read ResearchYou never have to call a malicious tool if its description alone can redirect the model's plan. Tool-definition poisoning hides in text…
2026-09-10 · 4 min read ResearchA model that treats a tool result as more authoritative than the system prompt has crossed a trust boundary — regardless of whether the…
2026-09-10 · 5 min read ResearchInstruction injection happens when text that should be inert task data — a tool result, a document, a SKILL.md file — gets read by the…
2026-09-10 · 5 min read ProductInside VerifyClaw's SAF-MCP audit: 33 static signature checks, disposable Morph Cloud sandboxes seeded with honeypot canaries,…
2026-08-01 · 7 min read Research79,239 skills catalogued from ClawHub, 75,357 graded by our grammar engine, 5,015 flagged CRITICAL or HIGH. Credential dumping and prompt…
2026-07-30 · 7 min read Threat Analysis177,980 downloads, a grammar score of 0, and a deep scan that came back CRITICAL 95. SkillScan poses as a mandatory security gate for…
2026-07-28 · 6 min readThe opening episode of Runtime AI Security introduces Zero Trust and Sandbox Isolation and its central thesis: author trust is an identity concept, sandbox isolation is a…
17:34A defensive walk through the manuscript's attack-vector taxonomy, focused on adversaries who target trust signals instead of the sandbox itself. Covers trusted publisher…
16:31The second half of the attack-vector chapter covers the subtler manipulations of trust: homoglyph and typosquatting impersonation, fabricated and synthetic endorsements, delayed…
17:18Episode four turns from attack to defense. We walk through the book's third chapter, where security testers attach probes directly to the sandbox, the trust verification system,…
17:22The final episode of Runtime AI Security assembles the defensive architecture from Zero Trust and Sandbox Isolation: thirteen principles anchored in a zero-trust baseline,…
19:31